Seatrade Maritime is part of the Informa Markets Division of Informa PLC

This site is operated by a business or businesses owned by Informa PLC and all copyright resides with them. Informa PLC's registered office is 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG. Registered in England and Wales. Number 8860726.

Reader's comment: Bridge design and the City of Rotterdam

Reader's comment: Bridge design and the City of Rotterdam
Further to Michael Grey’s excellent summary on the case involving the collision between the car carrier City of Rotterdam and the ro-ro ferry Primula Seaways, published on Tuesday in Seatrade Maritime News, it might also be said that the question arises as to what is and is not safe in terms of either ship design or navigation?

In the absence of any guidance from the Courts, any judgment as to safety can only be made, in the first instance, by those who are charged to make an immediate decision at the relevant time and place. In the case of the statutory pilotage system of which Michael speaks with accuracy, this can only mean that the matter of safety in the performance of any pilotage service is for the pilot and the pilot alone to decide, in the full knowledge that he will be liable for the consequences.

My own personal experience includes twenty-two years of service as a licensed pilot, during which considerations of safety were an everyday occurrence. An occasion which remains prominent in my own mind was when I was instructed to join a car-carrier in Birkenhead docks one summer evening and  proceed outward bound to sea. In Birkenhead docks the water level is high and the quaysides are low. In terms of spatial awareness, any navigation through the docks bears a passing resemblance to navigation through a rockery.  On approaching the ship, on foot, I happened to make my approach from the after end.  I noticed much froth at the stern and also that the mooring ropes were strained bar-tight, preventing the ship from moving ahead. It was obvious that the engines were turning ahead.

On going aboard the ship I went to the Master’s room, where both he and the Chief Engineer were present. On the completion of introductions I mentioned what I had seen at the stern. “Oh, no,” chorused the two, “The engines are stopped. We have been testing them all afternoon and have just finished.”

I invited both to step out on deck and to look at the mooring ropes, which they did; and then advised that if that is what happens with the engines at “stop” I would not begin to take the ship to sea. The explanation was offered that the ship had variable-pitch propulsion and that all could be adjusted accordingly. I said that if tug-assistance could be arranged, I might consider taking the ship to sea, but otherwise not. In the confines of the dock system there was no room for error and no time available for adjustments to things of prime importance which should already be certain. Tugs were not available and accordingly I left the ship, for her to make fresh arrangements for the next tide.

As Michael describes, there are innumerable circumstances  in which a pilot is obliged to make up his own mind, there and then, whether to proceed. That is the nature of pilotage. The City of Rotterdam was no exception to that general rule. Much has been written about bridge-design and there is ample support for the view that a fully enclosed wheelhouse with angled windows may create an accident waiting to happen. We have waited and it has happened.

Let us hope that bridge-design will improve accordingly.

Barrie Youde

Youde & Co
Maritime Pilotage Law
Liverpool
14.11.2017