Asian maritime security in Q4 – AIS spoofing and crimes at sea

Risk Intelligence examines security incidents and concerns in Asian waters in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Activity on Asia’s waters during the fourth quarter reflected a continuation of criminal acts in the form of armed robbery and thefts, with a welcome absence of hijackings. Sanction-busters continued to employ AIS spoofing to disguise their smuggling activities, while the Chinese Navy and Coastguard furthered the efforts to bolster territorial claims.

Piracy and Armed Robbery

Fortunately, the year ended with no additional vessel hijackings. The tug and barge hijackings noted in the first and second quarters served will to illustrate the low vulnerability of hijacking for internationally-trading cargo vessels, which have not faced acts of hijacking since 2017. However, seafarers remain exposed to potential acts of violence.

The most significant impact on cargo vessels operating in Southeast and South Asia during the fourth quarter was generated by the criminal activity within the limits of the Singapore Strait. Of the 40 reported vessel boardings in Southeast and South Asia, 22 involved armed perpetrators. While predominantly taking place at sea, one incident involved a vessel at berth and another involved a vessel at anchor. 27 of the incidents targeted vessels navigating within the Singapore Strait traffic separation scheme. The majority of vessels boarded in the Singapore Strait were bulk carriers, one was a general cargo ship, and several were tankers.

Related:Asian maritime security in Q3 – hijacking returns and AIS spoofing

Of concern regarding the boardings taking place in the Singapore Strait is an increasing level of aggression on the part of the armed robbers. One seafarer on board a crude oil tanker that was boarded in early-December required a week long hospital stay after being slashed by a knife-wielding robber.

Thefts and armed robberies were reported at a lower frequency at ports and anchorages beyond the Singapore Strait, namely at Batangas, Belawan, Chittagong, Belawan and Vung Tau. These boardings targeted container ships, general cargo ships, tankers and bulk carriers at anchorages and alongside. Common to all reported incidents, the perpetrators sought ship’s equipment, spare parts and supplies, and at times the personal property of crew. No cargo on board these vessels has been subject to theft.

By the end of 2024, criminal activity in the form of armed robbery and theft in Southeast Asia represented 57% of the global total. The 67 incidents recorded in the Singapore Strait represent almost 40% of the global total.

Related:Piracy and armed robbery incidents increase in the Singapore Strait

While the number of boardings recorded in Southeast Asia dropped slightly from 104 in 2023 to 99 in 2024, the increased vulnerability of seafarers to violent acts was illustrated by an increase of acts of armed robbery at sea from 15 in 2023 to 26 in 2024. Meanwhile, the Singapore Strait saw a 3% increase in reported incidents. In both cases, the relatively small numerical variations could be attributable to variances in incident reporting and do not necessarily represent actual decreases or increases in crimes at sea. As such, it appears that the dynamics surrounding maritime security have not seen significant changes in the region, and similar levels of criminal activity can be expected in 2025.

AIS Spoofing

Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC) continued to report on detected AIS spoofing activity. As was the case in Q3, Q4 saw the detection of several tankers broadcasting false locations and identities in the lower zone of the South China Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Malacca Strait, the Yellow Sea, and the Natuna Sea.

The majority of the spoofing continues to take place in the South China Sea off the Malaysian peninsula involving tankers. One incident in October, however, illustrates that the tactic is not restricted to sanction-busting fuel cargoes. The vessel involved was transiting the Malacca Strait transmitting details belonging to a scrapped ship. The AIS broadcast then ceased, and when it resumed after 38 minutes, the broadcast ID belonged to a dredger at the same location, with the same course and speed. The dredger has been linked to an incident recorded by the IFC in 2023 regarding the dredger’s involvement in illegal scrap recovery from WW2 wrecks off the Malaysian coast.

In one of the South China Sea incidents, within the space of 36 hours a vessel changed both the flag and MMSI numbers being broadcast on AIS two times, and at one point changed the IMO number to that of a vessel that was scrapped in Pakistan in 2013.

In many of these cases imagery from the European Space Agency's Sentinel-2 satellite was useful to verify that the AIS information was invalid.

The IFC has also highlighted one indication that AIS spoofing is receiving increased attention at the IMO, as the IMO’s GISIS ship particulars database was updated to show that one AIS vessel ID for a 79,714 crude oil tanker included an incorrect ship registry indication. Updates such as this will enable authorities to enhance their maritime domain awareness. The consequences caused by AIS spoofing, from the impact on safe navigation to potential implication of innocent traders to unwarranted prosecution, all warrant robust countermeasures by all stakeholders.

Geopolitics

As has been the case throughout 2024 and previous years, activities in the South China Sea and the waters surrounding Taiwan have received continued attention. Fortunately, as in the past, these had no significant impact on cargo vessel operations.

Q3 began against the backdrop of China claiming to have conducted "reconnaissance and early warning, sea and air patrols, and other routine exercises and training activities" near Scarborough Shoal while the US Seventh Fleet joined by its Asia-Pacific partners The Philippines, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand conducted joint exercises within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.

The reports included an interesting twist, namely that the Philippines’ authorities claimed that the exercises China claimed to have conducted did not actually take place.

Also, at the start of Q4 it was reported that Malaysia was persisting in its quest to expand oil and gas exploration and production operations in areas where China has also made territorial claims. China has attempted to bolster these claims by deploying regular patrols by the Chinese Coast Guard within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone.

It was also reported that China is not alone in fortifying islands in the South China Sea, as Vietnam has initiated similar steps in the Spratly islands by expanding islands and former reefs with the construction of harbours, defensive “trenches” and aircraft runways that reportedly can be used by the military. Vietnam’s efforts were reported at the same time that Vietnam and China reached agreements to boost economic, defense and security cooperation despite their maritime dispute in the South China Sea. China is Vietnam's largest trading partner and a vital source of imports for its manufacturing sector.   

Farther north, in mid-December China conducted what was described by Taiwanese officials as the largest naval deployments in the East China Sea and South China Sea in nearly three decades. Such concerns were, however, downplayed by US officials who described China’s sea drills as consistent with levels seen during other large exercises over the past several years.

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